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INTRODUCTION

ew people, no matter their political affiliation, would likely disagree with President George W. Bush’s statement
that “[t]axpayer money should be spent wisely or not at
all . . .”1 No one wants taxpayers’ dollars to go toward ineffective and inefficient programs. As such, President Bush has instituted a variety of accountability measures within his administration to ensure that taxpayers’ dollars are well spent. Two of
these mechanisms are the Millennium Challenge Account
(“MCA”) and the Program Assessment Reporting Tool2
(“PART”). This article will compare and contrast the PART and
the MCA indicators in hopes of identifying common problems
associated with performance measurements generally.

TOOLS TO MEASURE ACCOUNTABILITY

The MCA is an U.S. initiative3 designed to address global
problems such as poverty and health by promoting economic
development.4 The Millennium Challenge Corporation
(“MCC”), a government corporation led by a Chief Executive
Officer and a Board of Directors (“Board”) composed of senior
government officials, will administer the MCA. The MCA provides assistance to needy countries in the form of grants, cooperative agreements, or contracts,5 and thus far, Congress has
appropriated approximately $2.48 billion to fund the MCA.6
However, not all developing countries qualify for MCA
funding. Not only does the MCC require per capita income
thresholds,7 but it also requires a country that receives assistance to demonstrate that it is “ruling justly, investing in [its]
people, and encouraging economic freedom”8 by scoring above
the median on half of sixteen indicators in each of the three
areas mentioned.9 The MCA also includes an additional indicator for measuring corruption that is scored on a pass/fail basis.10
Countries must meet or exceed these indicators to obtain funding because, as President Bush stated, “[w]hen nations refuse to
enact sound policies, progress against poverty is nearly impossible.”11 The Board will then re-evaluate those countries that
meet or exceed the indicators and select the finalists that qualify for eligibility.12 Some organizations, such as the Heritage
Foundation, have lauded President Bush’s efforts at holding
nations accountable for the foreign aid they receive.13 Various
individuals claim that the MCA has the potential to ensure that
foreign aid money is not squandered.14 Additionally, supporters
contend that the MCA may create incentives for governments
that did not initially qualify for assistance to make the necessary
improvements to qualify for funding in the future.15
Critics of the indicators, however, raise concerns that funding is not going to the countries that need it most, and they may
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be right. For example, Bhutan, one of the countries disqualified
from funding during the Fiscal Year 2004 cycle,16 had one of the
lowest literacy rates among the least developed countries in the
past.17 Yet, education is one of the key areas of focus for the
MCA.18 Moreover, critics claim that needy countries, like
Bhutan, are not qualifying for funding because the indicators are
flawed, and not because these countries are incapable of managing aid assistance.19 Some of the most common complaints
about the indicators are:
• Too simplistic – sixteen indicators to measure
something as complex as national governance are
inappropriate;

• Not enough data or poor quality of data – data available is either insufficient or too poor or outdated to
accurately assess government performance;
• Selection for assistance is arbitrary – some countries that meet the indicator thresholds are not
selected, while countries that fail to pass are selected for assistance;

• Outcomes are difficult to measure – each of the compacts have performance measures built in, but it is
difficult to measure the project’s results during the
lifetime of the project, and it is equally difficult to
attribute the project’s success to the MCA.

Since the MCA is relatively new,20 one could assume that
the Bush Administration is simply struggling with a new concept of measuring performance through accountability.
However, accountability measures have a long and varied history in the federal government.21 The Bush administration, like
previous administrations, has developed mechanisms to maintain accountability in federal government programs. PART is
one of these accountability measures designed to evaluate the
effectiveness of federal government programs. Still, the PART
suffers from the same flaws as the MCA indicators. Although it
is commendable to attempt to eliminate inefficiency and ineffectiveness, a cautious approach is needed to avoid unnecessarily eliminating essential programs that help the most vulnerable
in our global society.

TOO SIMPLISTIC

Developing a methodology for evaluating a system’s effectiveness can be difficult, especially when applied to major programs like the MCA or PART. The PART, for example, is
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designed to evaluate such disparate programs within the federal
government as the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”)
Drinking Water Research Program and the Department of
Labor’s Adult Education and Training Activities Program.22
Therefore, the methodology has to be simple enough to evaluate
significantly different systems, while at the same time, complex
enough to reveal inefficient and ineffective programs.
In the case of the MCA and the PART, the methodologies are
so simplistic that they are often either under- or over-inclusive, or
produce absurd results. For example, the MCA has sixteen indicators in three broad areas – ruling justly, investing in people, and
economic justice.23 The “ruling justly” and “economic justice”
categories each have six indicators, while the “investing in people” category has four indicators.24 A country must score above
the median on half of the indicators in each of the categories in
order to qualify for funding. However, this approach allows countries, such as China, to qualify for funding despite a poor human
rights record.25 This occurs because several of the indicators within a category are highly correlated. For example, as with China, a
country can qualify by scoring above the median on half of the
indicators relating to governance and corruption, “rendering the
remaining indicators that measure political and civil rights in the
governing justly area irrelevant.”26
The PART is no less controversial for its simple formula. The
General Accounting (now Accountability) Office (“GAO”)27
found that it is difficult to use performance measurements in evaluating complex federal programs.28
The PART evaluates various aspects of a program by rating specific performance areas using a series of Yes/No questions.29 The
performance areas include: (1) purpose and design; (2) strategic planning; (3) program management;
and (4) results/accountability.30
Funding decisions can be influenced by a poor rating in the PART
evaluation. In other words, if a program is found “ineffective” or
if “results [are] not demonstrated,”31 the budget for that program
can be slashed or the program can be eliminated altogether. To
demonstrate, the Fiscal Year 2006 budget recommendations
called for funding decreases for 68 percent of programs deemed
ineffective, yet proposed funding increases for 62 percent of programs that rated “effective.”32 Critics of the PART argue that
such a simple Yes/No survey should not determine the fate of a
federal program. The GAO found that the “yes/no format employed throughout most of the PART questionnaire resulted in
oversimplified answers to some questions,” and that the “yes/no
format is a crude reflection of reality.”33

International and the Price Waterhouse Coopers Opacity
Index.34 However, for subjective concepts, such as corruption,
collecting or obtaining accurate data is difficult.35 Additionally,
data does not exist for some of these indicators. For example,
only 87 out of 115 MCA-eligible countries had enough information on the “days to start a business” indicator, and lack of
information was a problem for the indicators measuring education and health spending as a percent of gross domestic product.36 The World Bank notes that some low-income countries
should be “treated with special care” as data is simply lacking
on some of the performance criteria.37 Some countries, such as
Kiribati and Sao Tome, did not qualify for funding, and the lack
of data in several of the indicators may have contributed to their
disqualification.38
Another problem that has been identified with data is that it
may be out of date and does not accurately reflect current conditions in the country. For example, the MCC used the Heritage
Foundation indicator for trade policy to make selections for
Fiscal Year 2005. However, the indicator was based on data that
spanned from 2001 to 2003.39 A difference in a few years may
not seem like it would make a dramatic difference, but when
dealing with developing nations “judging the performance of
the current government, rather
than that of some previous administration, matters a great deal.”40
To illustrate, Bolivia, which qualified for funding under the governance indicator in November
2004, was subsequently embroiled
in a political crisis that may have
lowered its rating under this performance indicator.41
Poor quality data or unavailability of data has also been identified as a problem with the PART.
The EPA is one federal agency that
is struggling with lack of data in
measuring performance. A GAO
report found that the absence of
environmental data has made it
difficult to assess the effectiveness of some EPA programs.42
This does not mean that the programs are ineffective; it simply
suggests that there is insufficient data to accurately assess
whether or not the programs are in fact effective. The EPA has
been struggling with the issue of environmental indicators for
some time. For example, the EPA has executed efforts to
improve water monitoring due to the lack of reliable national
data, and the EPA has continued to work on the “environmental
indicators initiative” in an effort to track and report environmental conditions and trends.43

A cautious approach is
needed to avoid
unnecessarily
eliminating essential
programs that help the
most vulnerable in our
global society.

NOT ENOUGH DATA

Another failing of the MCA and the PART is lack of data,
or the reliance on inaccurate or poor quality data for evaluating
systems. In the case of the MCA, the governance data comes
from such readily accessible and reliable sources as Gallup
FALL 2005

SELECTION IS ARBITRARY

Both the MCA and the PART claim to reward high-performance and encourage poor performers to improve, but in
practice selection is arbitrary. Nations that do not meet the selection criteria are sometimes selected, while nations that would
otherwise qualify are not. For example, in one funding cycle,
even though 24 countries qualified for MCA funding, only six52

teen were listed as eligible, and the MCC gave no explanation
as to why those sixteen were selected.44 Moreover, some countries that did not qualify for funding were selected instead. For
instance, Bolivia did not meet the indicator on corruption, but
somehow qualified for assistance.45 The Board reasoned that
Bolivia was reconsidered and ultimately selected based on the
fact that the country was championing anti-corruption initiatives
in the nation.46
The same can be said of the PART. OMB Watch, a nonprofit government watchdog organization, found that 154 programs that were recommended for budget cuts or elimination in
Fiscal Year 2006 had very little to do with PART scores.47 For
example, more than two-thirds of those 154 programs never
went through the PART reviews.48 Furthermore, twenty percent
of programs that received the two highest PART scores were
eliminated, yet programs that received the lowest possible ratings were not cut at all.49
These inconsistencies have raised some questions about the
two methodologies. For example, critics of the MCA are concerned that nations are selected not based on need or qualification, but on their geopolitical significance to the United States.
For example, Georgia’s and Bolivia’s selections have been questioned because funding these countries seems to be advantageous to U.S. foreign policy objectives, rather than being motivated by financial need.50 Concerns have been raised regarding
Bolivia’s selection because the United States has a strong stake
in Bolivia’s counter-narcotics goals.51 Similarly, critics of the
PART question whether programs are eliminated as a result of
political motivation due to the lack of transparency in how programs are selected for an increase/decrease in funding or for
elimination. OMB Watch is concerned that programs targeted to
low-income and vulnerable populations are selected for PART
review solely in an attempt to do away with them.52

OUTCOMES ARE DIFFICULT TO MEASURE

Even when a country is selected for funding through the
MCA, additional measures outlining the nature of the project
ensure that contract proposals include performance measures.
For example, monitoring and evaluation must be a “part of every
activity for which MCA funds are used.”53 Monitoring and evaluation plans must include baseline data against which the activity’s progress can be measured, as well as benchmarks for evaluating progress.54 The MCA promotes the use of quantitative
measures such as results, outputs, and outcomes. Projects may be
terminated if they fail to meet financial or accountability standards, or if they fail to attain specific benchmarks.55

ENDNOTES: MCA and PART
1 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005),

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2005).

2 The Office of Management and Budget released the President’s

Management Agenda that outlined five government-wide initiatives, and
the PART used to judge the effectiveness of federal programs falls under
the initiative for “Budget and Performance Integration.” See generally
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There are several problems with using quantitative data to
measure accountability. First, results are often not available during the project’s lifetime. The Brookings Institution, an independent research and policy organization, found that “the real
impact of any project cannot be evaluated in outcome terms
until after the money has been spent” and that “benefits will
continue to accrue for years after the last disbursement of project funds has been made.”56 Second, even if performance targets
are met, the MCA funds may not be entirely responsible for the
success, as external factors may influence project results.57 On
the other hand, often when projects do not meet their targets due
to external factors, critics will still blame the MCA for funding
ineffective projects.58
The PART has also faced many of these same challenges.
Recognizing these problems, the Office of Management and
Budget (“OMB”) has issued guidance on implementing PART
reviews.59 The OMB guidance acknowledges that results may
not be achieved for many years, and suggests that agencies
develop short and medium-term steps that will ultimately lead to
the long-term outcome goal.60 The guidance falls short of stating that outcomes may never be achieved and emphasizes that
short-term and medium-term steps “are likely to be output-oriented, prerequisite accomplishments on the path toward the outcome goal.”61 The OMB guidance also recognizes that the program may be one of many factors contributing to the desired
outcome. This makes assessment difficult as to whether it is it is
the program or an external factor that is responsible for achieving the results. One suggestion is for the PART to establish a
broad outcome goal for a collection of programs and track the
goal using national data.62 However, as previously discussed,
data gaps and lack of credible and accurate data may prevent
agencies from establishing a meaningful outcome goal.

CONCLUSION

Performance measures have the potential to ensure
accountability. For example, in the first year of the PART, fifty
percent of programs were rated as “unable to demonstrate
results” but this decreased to 37 percent in Fiscal Year 2005.63
Further still, many advocates of the MCA are hopeful that countries that did not initially qualify for funding will strive to make
improvements so that they may qualify in the future. However,
there are still significant flaws with performance measures;
flaws that are serious enough to raise doubts about the suitability of such mechanisms for measuring accountability, especially
when used to evaluate programs that provide aid to those in desperate need of relief.
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